The author of this rather lengthy book proposes another way of obtaining a glance at the "heretofore rarely seen unity of the Kantian system." He suggests a common theme present in and often foundational for, many of Kant’s reflections, the notion of "action" ; more generally the notion of the human subject itself as a kind of Handlung. Such a project is certainly a plausible one. Kant’s frequent use of notions like spontaneity, self-legislation, freedom, and others make the prospects for (...) the author’s ambitious attempt at least relatively reasonable. Often, though, instead of a unified interpretation of various texts, we find here just isolated interpretations of Kantian issues, some indeed intimately connected with the theme of action, many tangentially related, a few not at all. The author’s whole approach also causes some difficulties. His style can most charitably be described as idiosyncratic; neologisms and odd contructions abound in every section: "transcendental constellation," "transcendental motion," "world projection," "practical being," "practical apperception," and so on. References to philosophers whose doctrines could, by contrast or similarity, help clarify Kant’s, are almost nonexistent. There is little reference to Leibniz, only a few references to Schelling and Hegel, and no discussion of Fichte’s theory of Tathandlung. Indeed there is no reference to any recent or classic secondary Kant literature. There is also a curious, brief, sweeping dismissal of all "analytic" philosophies of action as all committed to a thoroughly "causal" interpretation of action as observable behavior, predicable of a subject. (shrink)

Professor MacIntyre has here collected twenty-three of his essays. They range in topics from discussions of psychoanalysis to the relation between reasons and causes in accounts of human action. Indeed, the very range of such issues is part of the point of the book itself. In part 1 of the book, MacIntyre has collected some of the articles he has written over the last fifteen years or so for Encounter, New York Review of Books, and Partisan Review; in part 2, (...) the more traditionally philosophic pieces which first appeared in Philosophy, Philosophical Review, and Journal of Philosophy; by collecting both sets of essays within one set of covers, he has tried to make a point about the relation between such apparently different intellectual contexts. Most broadly, that point has to do with the common problem of "ideology" as it is found in each arena, whether as some explicit, historically achieved "self-image" by means of which individuals struggle "to provide the light that our individual and social lives need", or as the problem of the general role beliefs, reasons, desires, and the like should be said to play in human action, in what way such factors are related to causal explanations of action, and how decisions about such questions affect any view of what a social science is. MacIntyre believes that these somewhat more practical and more theoretical contexts need to be thought together, first because reflection on current, dominant ideologies greatly needs the benefit of "detailed, analytical conceptual inquiries," and because that analysis itself has often paid insufficient attention to its own broader, historical, even ideological context, and the effect such a context can have on methodology. Thus, while it is of the utmost importance to analyze thoroughly and as clearly as possible the language of morals, the methodology of that analysis alone cannot help in determining whether such a language is indeed the language only within which moral discourse can take place, and might also fail to appreciate historical alterations in the meaning of important terms. (shrink)

A careful, detailed, summary and interpretation of the development of Kant’s views on political philosophy from his early denial that the concept of obligation could be derived from Wolff’s Naturkausalität until all the major elements of his own Rechtsphilosophie could be identified. The major source for the author’s reconstruction of these largely unpublished views is, of necessity, the large volume of disorganized, problematically dated Reflexionen, and student transcripts and summaries of his lectures. He convincingly organizes these materials into four main (...) "phases": 1762-1765, when legal obligation was grounded in the notion of the "analogon rationis"; 1766-68, "The competent judge as necessary condition of law"; 1769-1771, with its initial attempt to connect a universal order of law and the problems of "Verstandes erkenntniss"; and post-1772, wherein, the author asserts, the truly critical foundation for Kant’s philosophy of law is discovered, his transcendentally justified notion of freedom. All of this material represents a judicious and quite useful compilation of pertinent Reflexionen and marginalia, but the author’s main purpose in amassing and presenting this often confusing material is interpretive and polemical. (shrink)

An unorganized but interesting collection of ten papers describing and evaluating the use of computers in legal research and the use of modern behavioral science in analyzing and predicting judicial decisions. The authors are professors of law, lawyers, and social scientists, and include a Soviet scholar writing on cybernetics and Soviet law. Technical descriptions of data recovery systems and technical methods of analyzing judicial decisions alternate with arguments for and against the actual use of such methods and systems by practicing (...) lawyers. All of the technical discussion is within the grasp of the interested lay reader; but the evaluation of these techniques becomes unspecific and polemical at times. The footnotes of many of the papers provide an excellent bibliography.—R. B. P. (shrink)

There is a central issue which runs through most of the details of Walker’s interpretation—the relationship between what he calls, taking his cue from Strawson, "transcendental idealism" and "transcendental arguments." He argues often and, I think, correctly, that the contemporary attempt to reconstruct Kant "austerely" in terms of transcendental arguments alone is misguided, that transcendental arguments about "what must be the case in order for there to be experience at all" cannot accomplish their task, and that we should rest content (...) with the more modest goal of discussing those aspects of our nonempirical "thoughts" or "beliefs" about the world which seem indispensably involved in our experience. Of course, we would still need something like a "transcendental argument" to establish these subjective conditions, but Walker uses that term to refer exclusively to Strawson’s austere reconstruction, and to argue that only Kant’s idealistic use of such arguments comes close to philosophic success. (shrink)

Sympathetic interpretations of Kant’s frequently stressed characterizations of his "architectonic" approach to philosophy are rare. As much as such an approach seemed to gratify Kant, it has embarrassed commentators, who have complained for generations about the "Procrustean bed" or ad hoc quality of Kant’s meta-philosophical principles. The author of this book proposes to take quite seriously the idea of a "unity in Kant’s thinking," but his approach to such an issue is historical and, for the most part, unsystematic. That is, (...) rather than discuss the philosophical importance of a claim for architectonic unity, he instead announces that he will demonstrate that the "unity" of Kant’s entire corpus is the "unity of a problem-determined development in his thinking, not that of a pre-conceived or static system." The result of this approach is a well-informed, but only incidentally thematic summary of Kant’s occasionally continuous, occasionally radically altered views of various Hauptprobleme. (shrink)

As the interesting title of this work indicates, its author is concerned less with Kant’s theory of morality, with its account of freedom, the possibility of pure reason being practical, and the deduction of the moral law, than he is with Kant’s Sittenlehre, or the account of the moral law as applied, moral judgment, and the substantive, derived duties of justice and virtue. Accordingly, he concentrates almost exclusively on two texts. The first four chapters are a commentary on and assessment (...) of the three chapters of the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, and his last two chapters deal with the two main sections of the Metaphysics of Morals. Other important texts of Kant’s moral theory are dealt with, as he says, en passant, and some are not dealt with at all. This approach has the virtue of focusing attention on perhaps the central Kantian moral problem: the nature of the transition from pure moral principles to "morals." It has the defect of being bound in too restrictive a way to the Groundwork as an expression of Kant’s general moral theory. There is no discussion of the synthetic or "regressive" methodology of that work, an approach which Kant realized aided its popular appeal, but greatly limited its theoretical adequacy, nor of the well known revisions Kant made in his moral theory, especially his account of freedom, by 1788. However, the author admits that he did not intend to write a book "directed specifically to Kant scholars." Instead, he tries to keep his discussion of textual interpretation minimal, always tries to present Kant’s arguments in a "contemporary idiom," refers only to English translations, infrequently to the Kant literature, and then only to English language literature. (shrink)

The author of this polemical book directs his attack more against what he sees as the overwhelmingly dominant "Kantianism" of "contemporary scientific thinking" than against the "Kant" of his title. This is, his book is much more a very general indictment of the "spirit" of this modern mode of knowing, than anything approaching an examination of Kant’s views.

Rotenstreich has here brought together several themes traditionally considered marginal in Kant's overall moral theory, themes which all bear on what the author calls the problem of the "realization" of moral practice. We are thereby offered not a discussion of such well known Kantian issues as the meta-ethical foundations for moral theory or the moral theory itself, but the Kantian account of a fully human moral agent, struggling to realize a moral ideal. The author suggests that this account is the (...) equivalent of a limited Kantian "phenomenology" of practical reason within a larger "phenomenology of practice" ; or more simply he claims that "our study is concerned with the place of empirical human behavior in Kant's practical philosophy". As well as offering such a summary and exposition, Professor Rotenstreich also suggests frequently that Kant's moral theory does not provide him with the theoretical resources to construct such a "phenomenology" adequately. Kant, it is claimed, needs a "link between the extra-moral position of empirical human nature and the moral status of the vocation of human nature", but, given his moral position, cannot offer such a link. (shrink)

At various times in his "Pre-critical" and "Critical" periods, Kant presented an argument about the nature of space that has come to be called the "Incongruous Counterparts" argument. First presented in his 1768 essay, Concerning the Ultimate Foundation for the Differentiation of Regions in Space, the argument holds that two objects, such as two human hands, might be exact counterparts, that is, identical in "size and proportion and... the situation of the parts relative to each other," and yet might be (...) still "incongruent," that there is no continuous rigid motion which brings them into coincidence in space; or, that they are, though counterparts, incongruently left and right hands. This argument appears in 1768, in the Dissertation of 1770, the Prolegomena of 1783 and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science in 1786. Unfortunately, while the details of the argument are virtually the same, the conclusions are not. Kant seems to have claimed that the argument shows: that a Leibnizean, relational theory of space was wrong; that a theory of absolute space was correct; that space was a pure form of sensibility and that space was transcendentally ideal, i.e., that space was not and could not be a feature of things in themselves. In the secondary literature, commentators who have dealt with this issue have simply noted the odd history of the argument and lamented it. Buroker's ambitious and interesting thesis in this book is not only that Kant's use of the argument is consistent and interconnected, but that the argument can be seen as the "origin" of Kant's idealism. She argues both of these points by arguing, in the great majority of cases, more for a logical than an actual or historical connection among the conclusions Kant drew from the argument; i.e., that she can illuminate the reasoning that led Kant from a rejection of Leibniz's relational view to his radical separation between sensibility and understanding, and then to his view that things in themselves are both unknowable and non-spatial. (shrink)